Melbourne Airport Emergency Planning Committee review the Airport Emergency Plan to confirm that planning and response arrangements appropriately consider the protection of public safety, the current security environment and the timely restoration of airport operations, and that it is consistent

The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner convene a working group of key emergency services and emergency management agencies to develop a flow chart based on scenario testing, to support decision making and the assessment of response requirements to medical, hazardous materials and CBR e

Melbourne Airport management, the emergency services and airlines develop risk based tactical plans that, where safe and appropriate, allow the staged or progressive closure or re-opening of terminal space to support continuity of airport operations during emergencies.

Melbourne Airport Emergency Planning Committee review the Airport Emergency Plan, to consider the use of alternative locations for staging, evacuation, assembly and incident coordination, to increase separation of emergency operations from non emergency activity be adopted.

Victoria Police, Melbourne Airport management, airlines and emergency services develop a Memorandum of Understanding for media coordination and public communications at Melbourne Airport that documents the responsibility for media coordination during emergencies to Victoria Police.

Reference to the Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting service in Part 6 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria, table of control and support agencies, be extended to include its responsibility for hazardous materials emergencies at the airport.

Melbourne Airport Emergency Planning Committee review the Airport Emergency Plan to ensure the capabilities of agencies are adequately documented and understood by all stakeholders, and that all agencies including airlines are represented at the appropriate organisational level on the Airport Eme

Metropolitan Fire Brigade and Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting service review and enhance the existing mutual response Memorandum of Agreement to provide more timely notification and therefore immediate access to appropriate resources to respond to emergencies.

The Committee recommends that, after a fire, as much vegetation as feasible be retained to minimise soil erosion from wind and first rains.

The committee recommends that the government actively manage native vegetation for fuel loads, weeds and pests.

The Committee recommends that native vegetation, excluding road reserves be fenced.

The Committee recommends that the government provide authority to a single community representative body to authorise clearing of native vegetation for fire management. (The community representative body must incorporate the CFS, DEH, Native Vegetation Council and local council)

The Committee recommends that when preparing the plan for fire management (including identifying where and when to undertake prescribed burning, firebreaks and fire access tracks) consideration must be given to the impact on local fauna.

The Committee recommends that relevant government departments implement an ongoing management program for the eradication of feral pests and weeds.

The Committee recommends that the government assess the impact on fauna movement prior to managing native vegetation.

The Committee recommends that training be provided to landholders to enable them to assist with prescribed burns.

The Committee recommends that the government in cooperation with local authorities identify if: sufficient firebreaks and access track exist; they are strategically located; and they are being managed.

The Committee recommends that the government in cooperation with local authorities assess fire tracks and breaks to determine if firebreaks and access tracks need to be wider and/or native vegetation removed so that it does not impinge on firebreaks or tracks.

The Committee recommends that the Native Vegetation Act be amended to allow for prescribed burning.

The Committee recommends that government consider options for assistance (including cost sharing) for farmers to fence native vegetation areas on private property affected by the Wangary fire.

The Committee recommends that the government in cooperation with local authorities prepare a management plan that includes firebreaks and access tracks in the region, including the location of current breaks and access tracks and where breaks and tracks need to be established.

The Committee recommends that the Native Vegetation Council have a consistent approach to prescribed burning on both public and private lands.

The Committee recommends that the government undertake public education programs to increase the awareness of the community to bushfires, the role fire plays in ecosystems and what steps they should take to minimise the impact of a fire.

The Committee recommends that the government establish designated fire safety areas within native vegetation and at road intersections.

The Committee recommends that the native vegetation planning and approval process for prescribed burning be amended to allow flexibility for burning on optimum days.

The Committee recommends that the Native Vegetation Council continue to seek mechanisms to interact with, and educate the individual farmer and landholder with respect to the Native Vegetation Act, its regulations and exemptions.

The Committee recommends that the government, via the CFS, coordinate the preparation and implementation of native vegetation management plans that incorporate management of fuel loads and includes a prescribed burning regime for the area.

The Committee recommends that prescribed burning should only be undertaken by professionally trained personnel.

The Committee recommends that the Native Vegetation Council provide landholders with assistance for applications for prescribed burning (via a guide, a proforma or staff).

The RailCorp defects unit should be combined with the passenger fleet maintenance division of RailCorp.

Train driver and guard training should encourage teamwork and discourage authority gradients.

All passenger trains must be fitted with an internal passenger emergency door release.

Uniform verbal descriptions identifying that power has been isolated should be developed by RailCorp and utilised by all railway personnel, electrical service providers and all emergency response personnel.

ITSRR should initiate and/or participate in the development of a national standard for crashworthiness of all passenger trains.

The risk of abuse of internal passenger emergency door releases should be further reduced by introducing significant penalties for any improper use of such an emergency facility.

All ATSB accident investigation reports should be made public.

A designated staff member at the RMC should act as the rail emergency management co-ordinator. He or she should be the sole point of contact at the RMC with other rail personnel involved in the rail accident and emergency services personnel during the rescue phase of the emergency response.

RailCorp should employ a Chief Safety Information Officer to manage the collection, collation, and dissemination of safety information within RailCorp.

RailCorp must establish a task analysis for particular categories of employees, to identify the specific skills and responsibility of those employees or groups of employees, and thereafter undertake a training needs analysis, to develop the skills required in particular areas.

All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must be fitted with external emergency door releases which do not require any special key or other equipment to operate.

The rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that the rolling stock is fit for its purpose.

The Advisory Board established under the Transport Legislation Amendment (Safety and Reliability) Act 2003 must be abolished.

Satellite telephones should be provided by RailCorp to all rail commanders at any emergency.

All reports of the Chief Investigator of OTSI should be delivered, upon completion and without being reviewed, to ITSRR and the Minister for Transport Services.

RailCorp should undertake risk assessments of each of its activities as follows:
(a) identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;

The New South Wales Government should make the necessary arrangements with the Australian Government, including any necessary legislation, for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to have the power to investigate all rail accidents occurring on the New South Wales rail network the invest

Regular field training exercises should be conducted by RailCorp with the emergency services to ensure that the incident command system and rail displan are able to be fully implemented as quickly as possible and are reviewed and improved.

The ITSRR should audit the RMC to ensure communications protocols are being followed. The sanction for non-compliance with communications protocols should be identical to that in the aviation industry and involve immediate removal from duty.

The incident command system should clearly identify the roles of the rail commander, site controller, police commander and commanders of the other emergency services, and the way in which each is to work together during the recovery phase of any rail accident.

RailCorp should establish clear safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions.

Training should be based upon a needs analysis, to determine what skills a particular person will require to carry out the tasks of any position safely and efficiently, and instruction and practice, to acquire and demonstrate those skills.

All trains must be fitted with a minimum of two independent engineering defences to minimise the risk of derailment or collision in the event of train driver incapacitation.

The internal passenger emergency door release should be fitted with a facility which prevents it from operating unless the train is stationary.

The ITSRR should impose a standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers.

Legislative changes should be enacted to ensure the complete independence of ITSRR from the Minister for Transport Services.

The ITSRR must provide a quarterly report to the Minister for Transport Services on the progress made by RailCorp in implementing these recommendations, including:
(a) a statement as to whether or not the recommendation has been implemented and, if so, is working effectively; and

The ITSRR should conduct its own risk assessment in relation to the risk of any such high consequence, low probability accident and, if necessary, direct RailCorp to conduct a further risk assessment to reduce the level of residual risk to a level ITSRR regards as acceptable.

The ITSRR should ensure that OTSI, as a division of ITSRR, co-operates and assists the ATSB in the conduct of any independent investigation by the ATSB of any rail accident or incident in New South Wales.

ITSRR should ensure that, as a condition of accreditation, each of these recommendations is carried into effect and should audit against them to enforce compliance.

The role of the rail commander should be to provide support and assistance to the site controller and emergency services personnel until the rescue phase of the emergency response to any rail accident is completed.

Staffing arrangements for ITSRR should be reviewed by it to ensure that adequate staff are employed in field positions, actively monitoring the safety of rail operations and compliance with conditions of accreditation.

The position of team leader should be created by RailCorp to be responsible for a group of approximately 30 train drivers, with responsibility to ensure that each train driver’s training needs are being met and that any safety concerns of train drivers are being properly addressed.

RailCorp should progressively implement, within a reasonable time, level 2 automatic train protection with the features identified in chapter 8 of this report.

The operation of the train doors should have an override facility whereby the train driver or the guard can override an internal passenger emergency door release system if the door release is interfered with when there is no emergency.

The standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers should provide that such information must be accessed in the circumstances of any accident or incident and can be accessed to monitor driver performance generally.

The Chief Executive of ITSRR should have sole accountability and responsibility for the regulation of rail safety in New South Wales.

The Minister for Transport Services must table in Parliament, each such quarterly report by ITSRR.

Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.

All accredited rail organisations should be required to re-apply every three years to ITSRR for accreditation.

The ITSRR should conduct random audits of accredited rail organisations for compliance with communications protocols.

The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control any rail employees attending the site of a rail accident, in accordance with directions given or arrangements put in place by the site controller, until the rescue phase of the emergency response to the rail accident has been

Alcohol and drug testing should be mandatory for any train driver or guard involved in any accident or incident.

All RailCorp operational personnel should be trained in the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms.

All new rolling stock should be designed to be compatible with at least level 2 automatic train protection discussed in chapter 7 of this report.

All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must have the external emergency door release clearly marked with the words “Emergency Door Release”.

Communications procedures must be standardised throughout the rail network, so that all railway employees describe the same subject matter in an identical way.

The ITSRR should publish guidelines to be followed by accredited organisations.

The Minister for Transport Services should retain, independently of ITSRR, safety auditors to provide a report to the Minister confirming or qualifying the contents of each such ITSRR quarterly report.

The ITSRR should have permanent access to the RailCorp intranet.

Recommendations one to seven of the final report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident should be fully implemented, save that the random auditing referred to in recommendations five and seven should be carried out by ITSRR.

A direct line of communication should be established between the RMC and Emergency Services Operations Control Centre by a “tie line” or otherwise, so as to ensure that in the case of a serious rail accident there is an open line of communication between the officer in charge of the management of

All emergency services personnel should be trained in the location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all rail cars.

Random alcohol testing should be continued.

All trains should have windows available through which passengers can escape.

All communications protocols must be strictly enforced by all accredited rail organisations.

The ITSRR should continue to participate in the development of a national system for rail safety regulation, provided that any ultimate agreement between the States and Territories and the Australian Government does not produce a safety outcome for New South Wales that is less than would be achie

The OTSI should continue to conduct rail accident investigations on behalf of ITSRR and report directly to the Chief Executive of ITSRR.

RailCorp should make it a condition of employment that all level 2 managers have or obtain a formal qualification in system safety management.

RailCorp should establish a comprehensive safety document management system.

All new rail cars must have appropriate signage and lighting identifying escape routes in the case of emergency.

Communications protocols and procedures should be standardised and mandated by regulations making them a condition of accreditation.

A safety management system regulation should be promulgated, specifying the requirements of safety management systems in all accredited organisations, using Annexure I to this report as a guide

The RailCorp Board should establish independent external safety auditing processes to regularly audit and report to the Board on the implementation of an integrated safety management system by RailCorp and on safety performance generally.

Staff at the Rail Management Centre (RMC) should receive training from RailCorp to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to provide precise and reliable information to emergency response personnel about the location of the emergency, the available access

RailCorp should ensure that where the safety competency of any manager is deficient such manager is required to undertake professional development courses to raise his or her safety competency level to an adequate standard.

The safety document management system should provide for the distribution of electronic versions of safety documentation to relevant staff.

All new rolling stock must be designed with an area of the roof through which emergency services personnel can access a rail car without encountering wiring or other equipment. That access point must be clearly marked with words such as “emergency services cut here”.

Defects reporting, recording and rectification should be integrated with the RailCorp regimes for train maintenance.

RailCorp should establish an integrated safety management system which includes the following:
(a) a formal performance management system, incorporating measurable safety accountabilities and responsibilities for each managerial position;

RailCorp should conduct internal and external safety audits to evaluate the adequacy of its safety management system and to ensure that any risk control measures are effective.