The recommendations of the Inquiry in relation to suitable ways of achieving well integrity contained in Chapter 3 be included in a guidance manual that is issued for the assistance of industry and regulators.

The body established to undertake a central coordination and facilitation role in the event of any future blowout in Commonwealth waters should undertake to make all relevant information publically available from one, authoritative and easy to access source.

It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is lo

The obligation of companies involved in an incident to meet the full costs of monitoring and remediation should be made a condition of approval of proposals under the EPBC Act and OPGGS Act.

Licensees and rig operators (and third party contractors involved in well control operations) should specifically assess, and document, the nature and extent of knowledge/skills of relevant personnel in relation to well control (including familiarity of personnel with agency‐specific requirements

Regulatory approval to rely on only one barrier should not be given unless (i) a proper risk assessment is carried out; (ii) exceptional circumstances exist; and (iii) risks involved are reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

The industry standard of two barriers should be replaced with the concept of ‘two or more barriers’ as a minimum standard. A minimum standard when operations proceed normally should never be regarded as a sufficient standard in other circumstances.

Any pro‐formas used by licensees, rig operators and contractors for recording information about installation of barriers should explicitly provide for ‘exception reporting’, that is, the form should include provision for recording any unforseen or untoward events which occur in the course of inst

The regulator, rather than the responsible Minister, should be given the power to direct an operator to use a particular rig for the purpose of well control operations, if appropriate in the circumstances, and the power should be used in the future if that rig is the best option available.

The funding arrangements that support the National Plan should be reviewed to ensure that the costs associated with both preparedness and response capability are equitably shared between the shipping and offshore petroleum industries.

The Government should examine the scope for a single environment plan to meet the regulatory requirements of both the OPGGS Act and the EPBC Act. This could possibly be achieved by way of bilateral agreements and accreditation arrangements and/or legislative amendment.

Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on.

Industry, regulators, and training/research institutions should develop standards that address best practices for cementing operations (including liaising, as appropriate, with overseas regulators) with a view to overcoming problems which can effect the integrity of cemented casing shoes, annulus

Batched drilling operations should only be undertaken after careful assessment of the special risks which such operations give rise to; well control must be maintained during the course of batched drilling operations.

The regulatory regime should also impose an obligation on an operator to ascertain the availability, and provide details to the regulator, of any potential relief well rigs, prior to the commencement of drilling operations (including prior to each phase of a drilling operation where applicable).<

OSCPs should be endorsed by AMSA prior to regulatory approval to ensure that they align with the National Plan. Once field operations commence, the capability of operators should be assessed against their plans, and exercises conducted to ensure the plans remain effective.

DEWHA should participate in training programs and exercises relevant to an oil spill in the marine environment.

Achievement and maintenance of well control should be written into the job responsibilities of key personnel, at every level up to and including CEOs. That is, a functional line of accountability for well control must exist up to, and including, CEOs.

Careful consideration must be given to equipment compatibility as part of well construction design.

Cement integrity should be evaluated wherever practicable by way of cement evaluation tests, rather than relying on pre‐operational calculations of cement and displacement fluid volumes.

Where multiple wells are drilled, operations and occurrences at one well must be carefully assessed for any implications with respect to well control at other wells.

NOPSA develop a policy of engagement with operators so as to enable experts (including safety experts) to canvas all available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

For the purposes of that review, the Minister should issue a ‘show cause’ notice to PTTEPAA under s 276 of the OPGGS Act.

Achievement and maintenance of well control should be written into the job responsibilities of key personnel, at every level up to and including CEOs. That is, a functional line of accountability for well control must exist up to, and including, CEOs.

It should be standard industry practice to re‐test a cemented casing shoe (that is, after WOC) whenever the plugs do not bump or the float valves apparently fail. Standard industry practice should require consideration of other tests in addition to a repeat pressure test.

The mere fact that the rig is over the platform should not be regarded by licensees or regulators as sufficient justification for reliance on only one barrier.

The Inquiry also supports Bills and Agostini’s recommendation: ‘…in relation to safety case development and compliance overall, that NOPSA revise its approach to interacting with operators prior to the safety case assessment process and subsequently direct more resources into its advisory functio

In carrying out a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence, the Minister should have regard to this Report, particularly (i) the adverse findings set out in this Chapter; and (ii) the extent to which PTTEPAA has implemented the Action Plan submitted to the Inquiry, or otherwise addressed the matter

Supervision/oversight of well control operations (within licensees, rig operators and by regulators) must occur without assuming adherence to good oilfield practice.

Any indication of a compromised cemented shoe which cannot be resolved with a high measure of confidence should result in the installation of additional well control barrier(s).

Relevant personnel from licensees and rig operators should meet face to face to agree on, and document, well control issues/arrangements prior to commencement of drilling operations.

The National Plan should be reviewed to clarify the arrangements to apply in Commonwealth waters regarding key roles and responsibilities, including in relation to the ESC, in the event of an oil spill. This should also address any necessary training required.

Licensees and rig operators should be astute in ensuring that corporate systems and culture encourage rather than discourage raising of well control issues. For instance, do performance bonuses or rewards actually encourage or discourage reporting of issues?

Well Operations Management Plan (WOMPs) submitted by licensees to the regulator(s) should continue to be the primary framework document for achieving well integrity.

Volumes of cement used in connection with barrier installation should be calculated with the assistance of a pro‐forma which records all relevant baseline data, which should be verified by onshore personnel.

Prior to commencement of drilling operations, senior representatives of the licensee and rig operator should exchange certificates to the effect that their respective key personnel and contractors have been informed in writing of agreed well control arrangements.

The National Plan should be revised to ensure that it fully comprehends environmental matters and that it recognises the importance of the prompt implementation of Scientific Monitoring to facilitate the assessment of the environmental impacts of an incident.

Logistics management of well control equipment should be conducted in such a way as to operate as a check against deficient well control practices, for example, use of serial numbers to track availability, testing, and deployment of well control equipment.

WOMPs should be comprehensive and freestanding, rather than an overarching document cross‐referencing many other documents (although the Inquiry also recommends a freestanding well control manual; this should be a guide to rig and onshore personnel on good oilfield practice).

If performance of barrier installation is outsourced by a licensee, the contractor (for example, the cementing company) should be engaged on terms which clearly require the provision of expert advisory services by the contractor with respect to barrier integrity.

Information relevant to well control must be captured and communicated within and between licensees and rig operators (and relevant third party contractors), in a manner which ensures it comes to the attention of relevant personnel.

Procedures for the approval of development projects should ensure that conditions of approval are comprehensive and clearly set out the obligations of their proponents in relation to environmental matters (including expected monitoring and remediation obligations).

The concept of ‘good oilfield practice’ should be supplemented by the requirement to incorporate into WOMPs non‐exhaustive minimum compliance standards in relation to well control: for example, stipulations as to when BOPs and/or well control systems must be in place and when they can be removed

Horizontal or high angle penetration of a reservoir should be avoided wherever practicable until such time as the apparent problems associated with the cementing of a casing shoe in these situations are satisfactorily overcome.

All communications between on‐rig and onshore personnel relating to well control should be documented in a timely manner.

DEWHA, in concert with AMSA and with expert input, should develop ‘off the shelf’ monitoring programs that can be speedily implemented following incidents in Commonwealth waters.

Pre‐drilling assessments should include a risk assessment of the worst‐case blowout scenario.

There should be a review to determine whether it is appropriate to introduce a rigorous civil penalty regime and/or substantially increase some or all of the penalties that can be imposed for breaches of legislative requirements relating to well integrity and safety.

Well construction and management plans should include provision(s) for reviewing the integrity of barriers at safety‐critical times or milestones, such as (i) prior to suspension involving departure of the rig from the platform; (ii) prior to re‐entry of a well after suspension; (iii) prior to re

Well construction and management plans should include provision for an independent compliance review of well integrity (i) in the event of stipulated triggers; and (ii) at least once in the period between perceived achievement of well integrity and production.

The BOP and rig should not move from a well until barrier integrity has been verified.

Licensees, rig operators, and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for their key personnel. Wherever possible, the competencies of key personnel should be benchmarked against their roles and responsibilities.

The National Plan should be reviewed:
a. to ensure that it adequately addresses the risks associated with offshore oil and gas exploration;
b. to revisit the underlying risk assessment undertaken to inform capacity and preparedness under the National Plan;

The Commonwealth co-ordinate a standing national arson forum between fire and law enforcement agencies to be held every two years.

The Commonwealth publish all fuel reduction plans and related audit findings on a national database.

At the conclusion of the current Bushfire CRC funding agreement the Commonwealth establish a new permanent bushfire research institute.

The Commonwealth consult with local, state and territory government planning authorities on the development and dissemination of a house loss risk index for households in Australia's highest risk bushfire areas.

The Productivity Commission be tasked to assess the economic effects of recent major bushfires on the Australian economy to determine the cost effectiveness of prescribed burning as a mitigation strategy.

The committee recommends that the Commonwealth co-ordinate a national approach to the pooling of ground fire fighting resources across agencies and jurisdictions to maximise the efficiency of their use.

The Commonwealth encourages further research into prescribed burning and its effectiveness and into alternative bushfire mitigation approaches through improved bushfire risk understanding at the asset level.

The Commonwealth assist the states with bushfire training for land managers and volunteers by co-ordinating curriculum development and delivery of a national bushfire accreditation course, to be delivered by the relevant state agencies.

The Commonwealth Government work with the states and their agencies to ensure consistent terminology is used when communicating with the public.

The Commonwealth organise the co-operation of state land management and fire agencies to provide the practical training aspect of the curriculum as part of a national bushfire accreditation course.

Further Commonwealth funding for bushfire suppression be made conditional on state fire agencies agreeing to the Commonwealth evaluating and auditing their fuel reduction programs.

The Productivity Commission undertake an examination of bushfire risk from ageing power infrastructure, including an assessment of replacement costs and likely suppression costs from bushfires caused by defective infrastructure.

Subject to the findings of the Productivity Commission, the Commonwealth examine options for the funding of replacement of power infrastructure that presents an unacceptable bushfire risk.

The Commonwealth Government examine potential new arrangements for Commonwealth involvement in the development and implementation of a national policy for bushfire management.

The Commonwealth seek agreement from the states and territories that would enable it to evaluate the adequacy of fuel reduction programs applied by public land management agencies in high bushfire risk areas, and audit their implementation against the program's stated objectives.

To provide adequate assurance on the validity of claims paid for disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

To improve customer awareness of the availability of disaster recovery assistance, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink:

To improve Centrelink’s preparedness for responding to future disasters, the ANAO recommends that Centrelink include disasters that impact on multiple Areas in its emergency and business continuity test exercise program.

The ANAO recommends that Centrelink assess the reliability of emergency recovery payment data and reports generated from its system(s), and update the approach, standards and procedures for the collection, storage and use of the data. 

That FESA assess the cost and other implications of proposed changes to bushfire prone zone declarations which would allow the whole State to be declared bushfire prone.

That the Minister for Emergency Services consider the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, Department of Environment and Conservation as a member of the State Emergency Management Committee.

The prioritising of the critical amendments to the Bush Fires Act 1954 recommended by the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee that relate to fire management, ie: a. Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA)‘s ability to assume control of a fire in specific circumstances b.

That further amendments be made to the Bush Fires Act 1954 be drafted to provide fire response agencies with the necessary authorisation and statutory protection to respond to a fire on private property, or land that Local Government, Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) or FESA is re

That the Department of the Attorney General, in consultation with FESA and Western Australia Police (WAPOL), consider options for legislative amendments to extend criminal liability to all damage, injury or death directly caused by arson.

The prioritisation, by the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), of bushfire preparedness activities including updating WESTPLAN - BUSHFIRE and coordinating bushfire exercises prior to the 2009/10 bushfire season.

Suppression resources should be ordered and mobilised as 2 truck Strike Teams with a STL and consistently deployed to the fire ground as a unit.

In preparing traffic management plans consideration should be given to which VCP’s are critical and need to be resourced with uniformed Police Officers and which VCP’s can be manned with civilian contractors.

A strategically located Staging Area serviced with check in/out personnel should be considered as early as possible at incidents involving an extended attack.

At large incidents a communications bus should be provided for the use by Air Ops and a designated work space should be provided for the Air Ops management group.

Provision of timely, accurate and regular information to the community via electronic media (radio and internet) is a recognised function of the Information Unit in liaison with the Traffic Operations Officer.

A formal IMG meeting should be convened as early as possible at initiating incidents with potential. At the very least early advice to potential IMG members should be made that a meeting is likely to be convened.

The Interagency Guidelines for Road closure needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism to identify bone-fide local landholders to facilitate their movement in and out of cordoned areas in sympathy with the Stay and Defend requirements.

Ensure the S61 helicopter has all appropriate channels for water bombing operations throughout the State by including this requirement on a pre-deployment checklist.

A review of community messages, their construction and component parts, the process to activate them and the technology required to deliver the messages by digital and non-digital media should be undertaken.

Potential IMG membership should be identified in local hazard management plans. The information needs to be kept current. The contact details for each member should be recorded.

Full briefings of traffic management personnel should be provided prior to dispatch to work areas – why road closed, what their authority level is, level of current risk etc

The ISU should be provided with a person with local knowledge at Level 3 incidents.

Pre-season multi- agency refresher training for Ground Controllers should be undertaken each year.

Provide a photocopier in the Mobile Communications Facility or the mobile equipment cache that is capable of large volume production of collated documents.

Portable, reliable mobile repeaters are required to provide radio communications into areas not covered by existing repeater networks. These repeaters need the capacity to be linked.

Public meetings are to be encouraged for all Level 3 incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect communities.

Prior to the bushfire season, potential IMG members, many of whom are members of the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) should be made aware of, and possibly exercise, their role as an IMG member.

The declaration of a potential Level 3 incident should be notified to FESA who can facilitate an early warning to CFCO’s in the Shire and surrounding LGA’s.

Information packs to be provided to road traffic personnel to assist with enquiries by public or provision to members of public and landholders who are defending homes/stock etc

Pre-season refresher training to include an emphasis on check in/out procedures

There is an established need to develop mobile accommodation and accommodation facility support solutions that allows an acceptable standard of accommodation to be provided to fire fighters in close proximity to the incident.

There needs to be a system that allows laptop computers brought to an incident to be configured at the start of the season and allow them to be easily activated to the correct configuration when they arrive at the incident.