The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment improve mapping support in the following ways: ■ DSE providing mapping data free of charge to emergency response agencies; ■ greatly increasing the CFA’s ‘write’ access to FireMap for incident management team staff; ■

Standards Australia do the following: ■ amend the objective of AS 3959-2009, Construction of Buildings in Bushfire-prone Areas, to ensure that it incorporates reducing the risk of ignition from ember attack; ■ review, and amend as appropriate, the testing methods prescribed in its standards for T

The State fund and commit to implementing a long-term program of prescribed burning based on an annual rolling target of 5 per cent minimum of public land.

The State identify a central point of responsibility for and expertise in mapping bushfire risk to: ■ review urgently the mapping criteria at present used by the Country Fire Authority to map the Wildfire Management Overlay, to ensure that the mapping used to determine building and planning contr

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment amend their policies on aerial preparedness and standby arrangements, their dispatch protocols and the management of aircraft in order to do the following: ■ require that at locations that attract the risk assessment

The Australian Building Codes Board do the following: ■ amend the performance requirements in the Building Code of Australia to ensure that they incorporate reducing the risk of ignition from ember attack; ■ work with Standards Australia to effect expeditious continuing review and development of

The Department of Sustainability and Environment report annually on prescribed burning outcomes in a manner that meets public accountability objectives, including publishing details of targets, area burnt, funds expended on the program, and impacts on biodiversity.

The State clarify whether, during major fires, Victoria Police should discharge its coordination functions from the State Emergency Response Coordination Centre or from the State Control Centre.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment require without exception that all relevant staff be trained in the need for Incident Controller approval to be obtained before a back-burn is lit.

The Department of Sustainability and Environment conduct biodiversity mapping identifying flora, fauna and any threatened species throughout Victoria and make the results publicly available. The format used should be compatible with that used for Bushfire-prone Area mapping.

The State, in conjunction with Emergency Management Australia and the Department of Defence, develop an agreement that allows Commonwealth aerial resources that are suitable for firefighting and support activities to be incorporated in preparedness plans and used on days of high fire risk.

The State modify its adoption of the Building Code of Australia for the following purposes: ■ to remove deemed-to-satisfy provisions for the construction of buildings in BAL-FZ (the Flame Zone); ■ to apply bushfire construction provisions to non-residential buildings that will be occupied by peop

Victoria Police continue to pursue a coordinated statewide approach to arson prevention and regularly review its approach to ensure that it contains the following elements: ■ high-level commitment from senior police; ■ a research program aimed at refining arson prevention and detection strategies

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment amend their procedures to require the following: ■ that at locations that attract preparedness levels A or B there be a full incident management team under the leadership of an accredited level 3 Incident Controller i

The State replace the Fire Services Levy with a property-based levy and introduce concessions for low-income earners.

The State revise the approach to community bushfire safety education in order to: ■ ensure that its publications and educational materials reflect the revised bushfire safety policy; ■ equip all fire agency personnel with the information needed to effectively communicate the policy to the public

The Department of Sustainability and Environment significantly upgrade its program of long-term data collection to monitor and model the effects of its prescribed burning programs and of bushfires on biodiversity in Victoria.

Standards Australia move expeditiously to develop a standard for bushfire sprinklers and sprayers.

The State amend the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to enable the Chief Officer to delegate the power to issue fire prevention notices.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment standardise their operating systems and information and communications technologies with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and interoperability between agencies.

The State consider amending the Emergency Management Act 1986 and the Emergency Management Manual Victoria in order to achieve the following: ■ remove the title of Coordinator in Chief of Emergency Management from the Minister for Police and Emergency Services; ■ clarify the function and powers o

Victoria lead an initiative of the Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood Development and Youth Affairs to ensure that the national curriculum incorporates the history of bushfire in Australia and that existing curriculum areas such as geography, science and environmental studies incl

The State amend s.

The State amend the Regulations under Victoria’s Electricity Safety Act 1998 and otherwise take such steps as may be required to give effect to the following: ■ the progressive replacement of all SWER (single-wire earth return) power lines in Victoria with aerial bundled cable, underground cablin

The State consider either amending the Emergency Management Act 1986 or adopting a standing practice to require the Minister for Police and Emergency Services or the Chief Commissioner of Police to consult the Premier about the possibility of declaring a state of disaster for all of or any part o

The Commonwealth lead an initiative through the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management, facilitated by Emergency Management Australia, to develop a national bushfire awareness campaign.

The State initiate the development of education and training options to improve understanding of bushfire risk management in the building and planning regimes by: ■ providing regular training and guidance material to planning and building practitioners; ■ providing regular training and guidance m

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to change their asset inspection standards and procedures to require that all SWER lines and all 22-kilovolt feeders in areas of high bushfire risk are inspected at least every three years.

The Country Fire Authority and the Department of Sustainability and Environment prescribe and audit the minimum number and nature of level 3 joint training exercises in which incident management team staff (including volunteers) are required to participate.

The State consider amending the Emergency Management Act 1986 to introduce a graded scale of emergency declarations short of a state of disaster.

The Country Fire Authority produce for community guidance material on fire-resistant landscape and garden design, including a list of fire-resistant species.

Councils should strengthen governance arrangements for business continuity by:

Councils should improve assessments of business continuity risks by:
• strengthening risk management practices to assure they identify and consider the full range of specific business continuity risks

Councils should improve the structure, format and content of their business continuity plans to provide greater clarity on roles and responsibilities for emergencies, more specificity on continuity and recovery responses, and better integration with other council disaster recovery and emergency p

Councils should strengthen their continuous improvement frameworks by:
• systematically reviewing the effectiveness of their business continuity activities
• regularly testing business continuity plans to assure they are up-to-date and effective

Local Government Victoria should, further to its work on strengthening the oversight role of audit committees, assist councils to develop good practice approaches to implementing, overseeing and continuously improving business continuity management.

The Department of Human Services should create evaluation guidelines for recovery operations, including links to planning. 

The Department of Human Services should complete work on emergency communication and information management issues. 

The Department of Human Services should base targets for staff in emergency roles on regional needs and develop a staff deployment strategy. 

The Department of Human Services should make sure relevant senior staff complete recovery training. 

The Department of Human Services should communicate strategic priorities to achieve state and regional level alignment in building recovery capacity and capability. 

The Department of Human Services should regularly test recovery plans with partner agencies. 

The Department of Human Services should work with regions and partner agencies at the state level to create consistent, streamlined impact assessment processes and systems. 

The Department of Human Services should develop practical, operational guidelines for implementing recovery at the state level. 

The Department of Human Services should work with the State Emergency Recovery Planning Committee, regions, and other partners to facilitate understanding and ownership of roles and responsibilities for common recovery services. 

The Department of Human Services should improve regional recovery plans through:
• developing a consistent format that meets Emergency Management Manual Victoria content requirements
• revising plans biennially with recovery partners 

The Minister should, as the JA for the offshore area of the Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, undertake a review of PTTEPAA’s permit and licence to operate at the Montara Oilfield.

NOPSA’s prohibition powers should be extended such that a prohibition notice can be issued where a NOPSA Occupational Health and Safety Inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that an activity is occurring or may occur at a facility involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of a pe

Well construction and management plans, and drilling programs, should include provision for testing and verifying the integrity of all barriers as soon as practicable after installation.

A separate, identifiable barrier manual should be agreed upon and used by licensees, rig operators, and cementing contractors. These manuals should set out best industry practice in relation to achieving and maintaining well integrity.

Barriers should not be installed or removed off‐line. The derrick should be located over a well at the time of removal and installation of any barrier. This will enable more decisive action to be taken in the event a problem arises.

Licensees, rig operators and relevant third party contractors should develop well control competency standards for key personnel in other entities involved in well control operations.

Procedures and accountabilities should be established to ensure, in the event of a future incident, that:
a. there is adequate monitoring of the volume of oil spilt and the spread of the oil (both surface and sub‐surface dispersed oil); and

The Minister should appoint a senior policy adviser to investigate and report on the best means to implement the recommendations contained in this Chapter 3 of this report.

Problems which arise in the course of installing barriers must be the subject of consultation between licensees, rig operators, and contractors (if used).

In view of the numerous well integrity problems in all of the Montara Oilfield wells, the Minister should commission a detailed audit of all the other offshore wells operated by PTTEPAA to determine whether they too may suffer from well integrity problems.
 

Wellbore gas bubbling should be regarded as a trigger for independent review of well integrity. Industry and regulators should identify and document other triggers.

Memoranda of Agreement should be entered into between operators in relation to provision of emergency assistance in the event of blowouts.

Secondary barriers (including PCCCs) should only be installed, tested, and removed with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The Inquiry supports the objective (rather than prescriptive) approach to regulation now followed in Australia. However, the pendulum has swung too far away from prescriptive standards. In some areas relating to well integrity there needs to be minimum standards.

The regulatory framework should provide that in respect of all activities in Commonwealth waters:

A single, independent regulatory body should be created, looking after safety as a primary objective, well integrity and environmental approvals. Industry policy and resource development and promotion activities should reside in government departments and not with the regulatory agency.

The use/type of barriers (including any change requests relating thereto) must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to installation. A proper risk assessment should be carried out, agreed upon, and documented in writing before installation.

If a risk assessment or compliance review is triggered by the happening of a predetermined event, specific consideration should be given to whether a ‘hold point’ should be introduced such that work must cease until the problem is resolved (and the subject of appropriate certification).

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

PCCCs should be installed in a timely manner (for example, to prevent corrosion in the MLS apparatus). Non‐installation in order to park a BOP is not acceptable.

To better ensure that ‘risks’ are identified and managed in accordance with sound engineering principles and good oilfield practice, it is recommended that regulation 25(1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) of the Management of Well Operations Regulations, be reworded as follows: ‘A titleholder must not commen

Environment plans and OSCPs should be made publicly available as a condition of approval of proposals under the OPGGS Act, and should clearly set out Scientific Monitoring requirements in the event of an oil spill.

The proposal of the Productivity Commission’s Research Report (Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, April 2009) to establish a NOPR should be pursued at a minimum.

Licensees should be subject to an express obligation to inform regulators of problems which arise in the course of installing barriers, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.

Removal of a barrier must be the subject of consultation between licensees and rig operators prior to removal. A proper risk assessment should be carried out and agreed upon, and documented in writing before removal.

In order that the ACT public can be reassured about the project management and financial planning in relation to the Fairbairn site as a proposed centralised accommodation facility for emergency services, the Auditor-General undertake a review of the project from a financial probity and project m

As soon as a risk of barrier failure arises, no other activities should take place in the well other than those directed to removal of the risk.

Use of single strings of intermediate casing to penetrate hydrocarbon bearing zones should be carefully risk assessed. Multiple strings of intermediate casing have the advantage of isolating lost circulation zones and sealing off anomalous pressure zones.

Wells should be re‐entered with a BOP in place unless a documented risk assessment indicates that well control can be maintained at all times.

The definition of ‘good oilfield practice’ in the OPGGS Act is unduly narrow. The current definition is incapable of application except where things ‘are generally accepted as good and safe’. The definition should be amended such that ‘good oilfield practice includes…’.

Arrangements should be developed to minimise duplication between the EPBC Act and the OPGSS Act Environment Regulation.

Responsibility for well integrity should be moved to NOPSA (as also proposed by the Productivity Commission).

The successful installation of every barrier should be the subject of written verification within and between licensees and rig operators; and should be the subject of explicit reporting to the relevant regulator(s).

Decision‐making about well control issues should be professionalised. Industry participants must recognise that decision‐makers owe independent duties to the public, not just their employer or principal, in relation to well control.

If a dispute arises between a licensee and a rig operator in relation to a well control issue, and is not resolved between them, the matter must be raised with the relevant regulator before discretionary operations proceed.

A minimum of two barriers should be in place at all times (including during batched operations) whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Any equipment (including PCCCs) used as, or to install, a barrier should be manufactured for that purpose and be generally recognised as fit for purpose.

Written (rather than verbal) approval from the DA (or new regulator) should be obtained before the commencement of well activities that lead to a physical change of a wellbore, other than in a true emergency situation (requiring amendment to regulation 17 of the Management of Well Operations Regu

The Minister consider legislative amendments to the OPGGS Act which make clear that

In the meantime, the Minister should:

The regulator should pre‐assess and review in a generic sense, and in conjunction with the offshore petroleum industry, available options for well control in the event of a blowout.

Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard.

Existing well control training programs should be reviewed by the industry, regulators and training providers, with a focus on well control accidents that have occurred (in Australia and overseas).

Perceived time and cost savings relating to any matters impacting upon well control should be subjected to rigorous safety assessment.

Reliance upon one barrier against a blowout must not take place except with the prior written approval of the relevant regulator and then only in a true emergency situation (see below).

Manufacturers should be consulted about how to address non‐routine operational problems affecting their well control equipment.

The OPGGS Act should be amended to allow for a power to suspend a petroleum production licence (in addition to the current power to cancel a licence or suspend its conditions).

In the future, and in the interests of ensuring that all possible well control options are comprehensively pursued to exhaustion, decisions as to well control response options should be the result of collaboration between the regulator and the operator rather than leaving one party to make unilat

The National Plan should specify that the cost of responding to an oil spill, or other damage to the offshore marine environment, will be totally met by the owner/operator.

A specific focus on well control training should be mandatory for key personnel involved in well control operations (including both on‐rig personnel and onshore personnel in supervisory capacities).

Wells drilled into hydrocarbon zones should be treated as live wells, with the potential to blowout unless a documented risk assessment establishes otherwise.

Licensees and rig operators should install an additional barrier whenever (i) there is any real doubt as to the integrity of any barrier; (ii) whenever the risk of flow from a reservoir increases materially in the course of operations; and (iii) where the consequences of a blowout are grave (for

Drilling programs dealing with barrier installation should incorporate relevant aspects of manufacturer’s instructions.

The recommendations of the Inquiry in relation to suitable ways of achieving well integrity contained in Chapter 3 be included in a guidance manual that is issued for the assistance of industry and regulators.